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Abstract 
Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in 
which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a 
proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In 
large part the answer depends on what we mean by ‘justification’. Epistemologists have 
failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to 
stop looking altogether. In spite of this, we submit a few candidate definitions. We argue 
that, although not giving the final word, these candidates tell us something about the 
possibility of infinite epistemic chains. And we show that they can short-circuit a debate 
about doxastic justification. 
 







It is well known that some series can go on harmlessly, while others eventually run into 
trouble. As of yet we lack an independent criterion to distinguish the one from the other, 
but it seems clear that the nature of the objects in question has something to do with it. 
Take for example the principle ∀ x ∃ y : y < x. If x and y are integers, this principle 
engenders a series that can continue unproblematically, since for every integer we can 
always find one that is smaller. But if x and y are natural numbers then the series must 
come to a stop, for there is a natural number that is smaller than any other natural 
number. So in order to know whether or not a particular series can go on, the character of 
the objects is important: we need to know what is the domain over which the variables 
range. 
 Moreover, the relation between the objects is of importance, too. If we change the 
principle into ∀ x ∃ y: y > x then the series can continue even with x and y as natural 
numbers, since every natural number has a successor that is larger. 
 What about a regress in epistemology? There the objects are beliefs or 
propositions (for the time being we will not distinguish between the two), and the relation 
is that of epistemic justification. Does it make sense to talk about a belief or a proposition 
that is justified by a chain of beliefs or propositions which is infinitely long? 
 The answer to this question depends largely on what we mean by epistemic 
justification. The problem however is that there are many different definitions of 
‘justification’ and that there is no communis opinio on which is the best one. William 
Alston has famously claimed that a definition of ‘justification’ is not needed, and in fact 
not even possible (Alston 1993, 2005). Alston considers this not to be a problem, since 
there remain enough epistemic desiderata about which epistemologists can fruitfully 
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disagree. Others however hold that, without such a definition, many an important 
epistemological debate will turn into ‘a mere verbal dispute’ (Steup 2013). Our position 
lies somewhere in between. Unlike Alston we believe it is worthwhile to search for a 
definition of ‘justification’. If we have not yet found a definition upon which we all 
agree, epistemological debates might still make sense --- pace Steup. 
 In this paper we offer three candidate definitions. We stress that they are only 
candidates, liable to improvement. However, we do believe that they can teach us 
something about the coherence and the possibility of an epistemic regress. The first two 
candidates for a definition are presented in Section 2. We explain that they share an 
important property, which we dub DIG, short for the ‘Decreasing Influence of the 
Ground’. In Section 3 we show that, thanks to DIG, the two candidate definitions shed 
light on a debate between Peter Klein and Michael Bergmann about doxastic justification. 
Finally, in Section 4, we propose a third candidate. 
 
 
2. Two Candidate Definitions and DIG 
 
The main reason why William Alston holds that a definition of justification cannot be 
given is that epistemologists have failed to pick out an objective feature of beliefs about 
which they are disagreeing. None of the selected features turns out to be neutral with 
respect to material properties of justification: each somehow implies that justification is 
either internalistic or externalistic, either diachronic or synchronic, either transmissive or 
emergent, and so on. A neutral definition simply seems beyond our reach.  
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 Alston may well have a point here, but a way to circumvent this difficulty is to 
focus on logical or formal properties rather than on material ones. Two logical properties 
in particular catch the eye: that justification is graded and that it is relational. The first 
property is relatively uncontroversial. It says that, unlike truth and perhaps unlike 
knowledge,  justification allows for a more or less. The second property implies that the 
expression ‘proposition or belief A is justified’ is actually a short form of ‘A is justified 
by B’. If it be deemed that A is justified by itself, then A and B are the same. 
 Taking these two properties together, we can see that the expression that we want 
to define, our definiendum, is: ‘the extent or degree to which A is justified by B’. For 
example, the proposition “A hurricane will hit the east coast” (A) is justified to a certain 
degree by the proposition “The ground radar system has detected such and such” (B). 
 If B is true, our definiendum is given by P(A|B); if B is false, it is given by 
P(A|¬B) if. If, as a third possibility, B is  neither true nor false but only probable, then the 
definiendum will be represented by an interpolation between P(A|B) and P(A|¬B). The 
formula that expresses this interpolation is the rule of total probability, and it gives us our 
first tentative definition:  
 
   P(A|B) P(B) + P(A|¬B) P(¬B)    (1) 
 
Clearly, if B is true, then (1) reduces to P(A|B), and if B is false, it reduces to P(A|¬B). 
 A great advantage of (1) is that it is neutral with respect to the material character 
of justification. For it can accommodate various positions: that justification is 
internalistic, externalistic, doxastic, propositional, synchronic, diachronic, transmissive, 
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emergent, and so on. The reason for this is clear: (1) only stresses logical properties of 
‘justification’, not material ones. Thus it alleviates the pressure created by Alston’s 
difficulty.  
 Unfortunately, our first candidate also has a drawback; in fact, it has two. The 
first is that it does not define ‘the extent or degree to which A is justified by B’, but 
simply gives the unconditional probability of A, i.e. P(A). The second is that it allows the 
degree to be very low, so low that we would not be inclined to say that B justifies A. 
 However, the first drawback is only apparent. For in reality there is no such thing 
as the unconditional probability of the target A. What the unconditional probability of A 
is depends on the justifier, in this case P(B). Had the latter been different, the value of 
P(A) would have been different too. Of course, the same applies to B itself: we can take B 
as our target, and then P(B) depends on its  justifier, and so on. 
 As to the second drawback, this is indeed a problem, but matters can be readily 
repaired (cf. Atkinson and Peijnenburg 2009, 184). We merely have to insert a threshold 
t, and require that the degree of justification exceeds it: 
 
   P(A|B) P(B) + P(A|¬B) P(¬B) > t    (2) 
 
How high the threshold is in a particular case typically will depend on pragmatic 
considerations. 
 The definitions that we have examined so far share an important feature that we 
call DIG: the Decreasing Influence of the Ground. DIG implies that the justification that 
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the ground B bestows on A diminishes as B recedes from A. This can be explained as 
follows (see Peijnenburg and Atkinson 2013 for a fuller explanation). 
 Imagine that the target proposition or belief A (“A hurricane will hit the east 
coast”) is not directly justified by B (detection by ground radar system), but by some 
intermediate propositions. For example, A might be justified by the proposition that I 
heard it from a friend (X1), which in turn is justified by the proposition that this friend 
read it in the newspaper (X2), which in its turn is justified by the proposition that the 
newspaper got the information from press agency Reuter (X3), and so on, until the 
grounding proposition B about the observation by the ground radar. This gives us a 
justificatory chain, in which each link, we assume, is defined in terms of our second 
definition. 
 How do we determine the degree of justification that this chain gives to A? It 
seems that in order to do that we need to know many conditional probabilities: of A given 
X1, of A given ¬X1, of  X1 given X2, of  X1 given ¬X2 , and so on. Now imagine that 
empirical research has taught us that these conditional probabilities are as follows: 
 
P(A| X1) = P(X1 | X2) = P(X2 | X3) = .... = P(Xn-1 | Xn) = P(Xn | B) = 0.99 
P(A|¬X1) = P(X1 |¬X2) = P(X2 |¬X3) = .... = P(Xn-1 |¬Xn) = P(Xn |¬B) = 0.04 
 
These numbers only serve as an example, since our argument works with any values of 
the conditional probabilities. 
 Knowing the conditional probabilities is however not enough to determine the 
degree of justification that the chain gives to A. We also have to know the probability of 
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B. At this stage, this probability is unconditional; since B is taken as the ground or 
foundation of the chain, it is not conditioned by another proposition. 
 Let us assume that the unconditional probability of B is .7. The justificatory 
degrees of A (according to our first tentative definition) are listed in the following table:  
 
 
 Number of X’s    1    2    5   10   50  100  ∞ 
 Justification of A .709 .714 .726 .743 .793 .799 .8  
 
 Table 1: Justificatory degrees of A when the probability of B is 0.7 
 
The upper row displays the numbers of propositions X. In the first entry there is one X, so 
we are dealing with a short finite chain containing only two links; in the fourth entry 
there are ten X’s, so the chain consists of eleven links, and so on. The lower row shows 
the corresponding values for the degree of justification of A. If the chain has two links, 
then the justification of A is .709, if the chain has eleven links, then the justification is 
.743. And when there is an infinite number of links, the justification of A converges to 
0.8.  Here the justification for A has reached its definitive value, relative to the numbers 
chosen for the conditional probabilities.  
 Let us now change the unconditional probability of B to 0.95, but keep the same 
conditional probabilities as in Table 1. The result is Table 2:  
 
 Number of X’s    1    2    5   10   50 100  ∞ 
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 Justification of A .935 .929 .910 .885 .811 .801 .8  
 
 Table 2: Justificatory degrees of A when the probability of B is 0.95 
 
Two observations should be made. First, the justification for A culminates in a limiting 
value that is the same as in Table 1, namely of 0.8. This seems strange. How can it be that 
different probability values of B in the end lead to the same degree of justification for A? 
Second, while the numbers in Table 1 steadily increase as the number of links becomes 
larger, those in Table 2 steadily go down. How can we understand that? 
 In both cases, the answer is provided by DIG. Together, all the links in a chain 
confer upon A an exact, definitive degree of justification, but DIG implies that the further 
away a link is from A, the less it contributes to that definitive degree. This applies first 
and foremost to the ground B, since of all the links B is the furthest away from A. But it 
also applies to the conditional probabilities P(Xn-1 |Xn) and P(Xn-1|¬Xn): their justificatory 
rôle for A also diminishes as n becomes bigger. If the chain is infinite, as in Tables 1 and 
2, then B is infinitely far removed from A. Consequently, the contribution of B is nil: the 
probability of B might be high or might be low, that has no effect whatsoever on the final 
degree of justication of A. All that matters now are the conditional probabilities, and the 
ones close to A matter most. The reason why the numbers in Table 1 go up, while those in 
Table 2 go down, is precisely because in the first case the probability of the infinitely 
remote B is lower than the final justificatory degree of A, and in the second case it is 
higher.i  
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3.  Settling a debate between Klein and Bergmann 
 
Up to this point we have not distinguished between propositional and doxastic 
justification: A, B and Xn could be either propositions or beliefs. It has however often 
been pointed out that the distinction is relevant when we talk about justification, 
especially when we discuss the possibility of infinite justificatory chains. Thus Michael 
Bergmann has argued that propositional justification might go on and on, but doxastic 
justification must always come to a stop: infinitism and doxastic justification simply 
seem incompatible (Bergmann 2007).  
 Peter Klein agrees that, unlike propositional justification, doxastic justification is 
always finite. He does not see this as a difficulty for infinitism, however, since the stop is 
merely a contextual or pragmatic matter. In Klein’s view, doxastic justification is 
parasitic on propositional justification. In principle it can go on and on, but in practice it 
ends, since after all “We get tired. We have to eat. We have satisfied the enquirers. We 
die.” (Klein 2007a, 16).  
 Bergmann, however, believes that Klein’s position is untenable. In order to reject 




K1: For a belief Bj to be doxastically justified, it must be based on some other belief Bj+1. 
 
He then tries to catch Klein on the horns of a dilemma by introducing: 
 
K2: A belief Bj can be doxastically justified by being based on some other belief Bj+1 
only if Bj+1 is itself doxastically justified. 
 
Klein must either accept or reject K2. If he rejects it, then he must maintain that a belief 
Bj can be doxastically justified by another belief Bj+1 even if the latter is itself unjustified. 
This would turn Klein into a defender of what Bergmann calls the unjustified foundations 
view --- an outlook that is not particularly Kleinian, to put it mildly. On the other hand, if 
Klein accepts K2 along with K1, then he would run the risk of becoming a skeptic. For 
“then he is committed to requiring for doxastic justification an infinite number of actual 
beliefs [...] But it seems completely clear that none of us has an infinite number of actual 
beliefs [...]” (ibid.)  
 We believe that DIG shows this dilemma to be illusory. DIG takes seriously the 
idea that justification comes in degrees, and it implies that there is another way to reject 
K2.ii If doxastic justification draws on propositional justification, the justification that 
one belief gives to another also diminishes as the distance between them increases. More 
precisely, a belief B1 can be doxastically justified by a long chain of other beliefs, B2 , B3 , 
to Bn , such that: 
 
1. each Bm is conditionally justified by Bm+1, where 2 ≤  m ≤ n-1; 
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2. Bn may be justified by another belief, or may justify itself, or may be unjustified; 
3. the effect of Bn on B1 becomes smaller as n becomes bigger and bigger. 
 
In the limit that n goes to infinity, the justificatory support given by Bn to B1 vanishes 
completely. In that case it does not matter for the doxastic justification of B1 whether Bn  
is justified or not: B1 can still be doxastically justified. The choice is not between 
indefinitely going on and the unjustified foundations view. There is a third possibility. 
Recognizing that any justification that Bn gives to B1 diminishes as the distance between 
the two is augmented, we might decide to stop at Bn because the justificatory contribution 
that any further belief would bestow on B1 is deemed to be too small to be of interest. 
 This particular way of rejecting K2 goes unnoticed in the debate between 
Bergmann and Klein. Because DIG is not taken into account, one fails to realize that 
‘stopping at a belief Bn’ can have more meanings than those that have been envisioned in 
the debate. It need not mean ‘making an arbitrary move’, as some coherentists have 
claimed. Nor need it imply that Bn is taken to be unjustifed or self-justified. Rather, an 
agent can decide to stop at a belief Bn because she realizes that, for her purposes, Bn+1  
has become irrelevant for the justification of B1. She finds the degree of justification 
conferred upon B1 by B2 to Bn accurate enough and feels no need to make it more accurate 
by taking Bn+1 into account. For her, the justificatory contribution that Bn+1 gives to B1 
has become negligible.  
 Of course, when exactly a justificatory contribution is deemed to be negligible 
depends again on pragmatic considerations, but our two tables show that we are able to 
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make these considerations as precise as we wish. For they allow us to identify a point at 
which the rôle of Bn can be said to be small enough to be neglected.iii 
 
 
 4.  A third candidate 
 
Recall our second candidate definition: 
 
   P(A|B) P(B) + P(A|¬B) P(¬B) > t    (2) 
 
Unfortunately, this candidate has a drawback as well. It identifies ‘epistemic justification’ 
as ‘probabilistic or evidential support’, and this is very questionable. For it might happen 
that the probabilistic support is high, well beyond the threshold, while we would not say 
that there is justification. Conversely, there might be justification even though the 
probabilistic support is quite low. Qualms about the identification of justification and 
evidential support have been expressed on several occasionsiv, but Martin Smith found an 
especially arresting way to phrase them. (Smith 2010). 
 Smith compares the difference between epistemic justification and evidential 
support with the difference between ceteris paribus laws and mere statistical 
generalizations. The former tell us when events are normal or abnormal while the latter 
only imply that events are likely or unlikely. Here are two examples, both taken from 
Smith’s paper.  
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 Imagine that I have bought a ticket in a fair lottery with a billion tickets. Since the 
lottery is fair, I will very likely lose, the chance of winning being only one billionth. If, 
however, against these odds I do win, this is only very unlikely, it is not abnormal. After 
all, someone had to win, and it might as well be me. On the other hand, if a completely 
healthy individual in front of me suddenly drops dead, this would be abnormal; it would 
require an explanation. My winning the lottery, however, does not require an explanation 
--- there is nothing to explain. And this is so even if the evidential support for the 
proposition “I will not win the lottery” (¬L) is much higher than the evidential support for 
the proposition “The person in front of me will not suddenly drop dead” (¬D). For ¬D is 
normically supported by evidence whereas ¬L is not. 
 The second example is inspired by a paper of Dana Nelkin (ibid. 13; Nelkin 2000, 
3888-389). Suppose that the background color of my computer screen is determined by a 
random number generator, such that in one out of a million possible values it will be red. 
For the remaining 999,999 values, the color will be blue. One day I turn on my computer 
and without looking I go to the adjacent room. In the meantime Bruce, who is oblivious 
of all this, enters my computer room and sees that the color is blue. Let A be the 
proposition “The color is blue”. Both Bruce and I have evidence that supports A. My 
evidence, let’s call it E1, consists of my knowledge about the random number generator. 
Bruce’s evidence, E2, consists of his seeing blue. Neither E1 nor E2 implies the truth of A. 
I cannot be sure that the color is blue, and neither can Bruce. After all, he could be 
hallucinating, or be struck by color blindness. Smith argues that Bruce is justified in 
believing A and I am not, even if  P(A| E1) > P(A| E2). For Bruce’s belief in A is a 
candidate for real knowledge, whereas mine will never be. If there is a power failure after 
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Bruce has entered my computer room, he can always claim that he knows the color was 
blue, but I, in the other room, will never be justified in making that claim.  
 We think these examples are intuitively very convincing, and they indicate that 
epistemic justification is not the same as probabilistic or evidential support.v  Clearly 
something has to be added to probabilistic support to turn it into justification. This insight 
takes us to our third and final candidate for a definition of justification. It consists of the 
second candidate plus something else: 
 
  [P(A|B) P(B) + P(A|¬B) P(¬B) > t ]  + something else  (3) 
 
What to fill in for ‘something else’? According to Smith it is “normalcy”, the property 
that the support is “normic”. Unlike mere probabilistic support, normic support “is closed 
under multi-premise deductive consequence” (ibid., 26). If I am justified in A and 
justified in B, then I am justified in A&B. But if I have high evidential support for A and 
high evidential support for B, it does not follow that A&B is highly supported.vi  
 No matter what exactly we fill in for ‘something else’, our third candidate states 
that evidential support as such does not produce justification. If there is justification, then 
there is evidential support, but not the other way around. Since (3) implies that 
justification is a constraint on evidential support, the latter is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for justification. 
 However, we have seen in Section 2 that evidential support is sufficient for DIG. 
From this it follows that justification, too, suffices for DIG, no matter what exactly 
justification turns out to be. For infinitists this is good news. It implies that the very idea 
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of a proposition or belief being justified by an infinite chain is not incoherent, thus taking 
the sting out of some major conceptual objections against infinitism. For foundationalists 
the news is neither good nor bad; it merely means that only those versions of 
foundationalism are viable that take DIG on board. 
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i This ‘washing out’ of the influence of B, as the number of links in the chain increases 
indefinitely, should not be confused with the familiar washing out of the influence of the 
prior probability during repeated Bayesian updatings, under the influence of new 
‘incoming information’. These are completely different effects. 
ii Klein also argues that “rejecting K2 does not entail endorsing an unjustified 
foundationalist view” (Klein 2007b, 28). His argument is somewhat different from ours, 
but we believe that our DIG-based reasoning can capture his most important intuitions.  
iii Cf. Klein: “The infinitist will take the belief that p to be doxastically justified for S just 
in case S has engaged in providing ‘enough’ reasons along the parth of endless reasons. 
... How far forward ... S need go seems to me a matter of the pragmatic features of the 
epistemic context” (Klein 2007a, 10). See also Nicholas Rescher: “in any given context 
of deliberation the regress of reasons ultimately runs out into ‘perfectly clear’ 
considerations which are (contextually) so plain that there just is no point in going 
further. … Enough is enough.” (Rescher 2010, 47). 
iv Aikin 2011, Chapter 3; Klein 1999, 312; Klein 2003, 722; Shogenji 2012. 
v Note, however, that we have only examples to rely on. Smith explicitly refrains from 
answering the question how to distinguish the ‘genuinely abnormal’ from the ‘merely 
unlikely’: “The question ... is a somewhat delicate one, and I don’t propose to investigate 
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further here.” (ibid., 22). A conclusive answer would indeed be no small 
accomplishment, as it would bring us close to solving Hume’s problem. 
vi Tomoji Shogenji also argued that justification is closed under deduction, in 
contradistinction to mere probabilistic support. He proposes a measure for justification 
which assumes that, if A is justified and B is justified, then A&B is justified on condition 
that A and B are independent (Shogenji 2012).  
